The key facts

  • Professor Robert Dover: US support has become increasingly conditional and politicized
  • The Netherlands admitted that it sometimes withholds intelligence from the US and has increased sharing with European partners
  • In May 2026, the Pentagon announced the withdrawal of 5,000 troops from Germany; the posture review recommended additionally withdrawing 25–40 thousand of ~80 thousand in Europe

What the author claims

Professor of intelligence and national security Robert Dover, dean of the business school at the University of Hull, in an op-ed describes the changing conditions under which European intelligence services operate. In his assessment, while core capabilities and counterterrorism cooperation remain, support from Washington has become increasingly transactional and politicized, especially on matters related to Russia. This, the author believes, creates a difficult planning environment for European governments.

Three shifts and dependence on the US

Dover identifies three changes. The first is a change in the craft: intelligence is increasingly engaged not only in preventing surprises but also in disrupting the actions of hostile states, organizations and individuals; MI6 has publicly announced a more offensive posture, while Turkey's MIT combines technical collection with 'intelligence diplomacy', including acting as a mediator in ceasefire talks over Gaza. The second is the shift of security innovation from state monopolies to the private sector, above all in Silicon Valley, which gives middle powers access to high technology but creates dependence on American commercial supply chains that are subject to political influence. The third is the transition from alliances to transactional coalitions, where intelligence sharing increasingly happens on a case-by-case basis.

Infrastructure dependence

In the author's assessment, Europe's intelligence infrastructure still depends on the US: the Five Eyes alliance excludes continental Europe from full membership, and, according to the estimate cited by Dover, about 85% of the intelligence flowing into Five Eyes is American in origin. Europe has no early-warning satellites of its own for missile attack detection and is heavily dependent on American cloud computing and software platforms. The author asserts that Europe failed to mobilize capital for serious competition in frontier AI models and found itself between two 'AI superpowers' — the US and China; he calls this a mistake. In his words, EU institutions are so far building capabilities mainly in analysis rather than intelligence collection: on September 1 the Security College secretariat began operating within the European Commission, but intelligence collection remains a national competence under EU treaties. Former President of Finland Sauli Niinistö, who proposed creating an EU intelligence service, acknowledges that further negotiations among member states will be needed for data collection.

The reaction of European services

Europe's first response, Dover writes, was to mirror the American approach — greater caution in data sharing. In October 2025, the Dutch AIVD and MIVD acknowledged that they increasingly assess intelligence independently and sometimes withhold information from the US, while sharply increasing exchanges with British, German, Scandinavian, French and Polish services. In December 2025, Danish military intelligence concluded that the US considers the use of military force against allies; a few weeks later, Trump's threats toward Greenland, in the author's assessment, confirmed the Danish conclusion.

Reduction of the American presence and offensive powers

In May 2026, the Pentagon announced the withdrawal of 5,000 troops from Germany, and the posture review recommended additionally withdrawing between 25,000 and 40,000 of the roughly 80,000 American troops in Europe; in parallel, the US is negotiating a new permanent base in Poland. Dover interprets this as selective cooperation, in which the US simultaneously rewards and punishes allies. On August 12, Germany approved plans allowing the BND to penetrate foreign IT systems and disable them in the event of an attack on Germany, while the domestic service BfV is for the first time granted operational powers — after prohibitions in place since the Second World War. The author links this to Russia's campaign of 'war below the threshold': arson, sabotage, threats against defense officials, cyberattacks, drones over airports and damage to undersea cables. According to a report by the US Congressional Research Service, which the author cites, the number of Russian hybrid attacks in Europe quadrupled from 2023 to 2024.

Unevenness of reforms and the absence of a unified structure

The transformation, in Dover's view, is proceeding unevenly because the fear needed for reform is felt unevenly. Poland, the Baltic states and Northern Europe, for which the threat from Russia is immediate, are the most aggressive in sharing intelligence and pushing the others; Der Spiegel has called Poland a testing ground for Russian sabotage activity. Germany has faced sabotage at airports, Denmark — a double alarm due to Russia in the Baltic and the US in the Arctic. Southern Europe, in the author's assessment, perceives the Russian threat less acutely: when reports emerged in September 2026 about a CIA warning regarding Russian ship-based drones targeting Spain, France or Italy, Italy's defense minister called the alarm unconfirmed; southern EU countries are more concerned with Libya, migration and the Middle East. The author's conclusion: there is no single European army or intelligence service — a network of national services is being built, linked by 'coalitions of trust' and still dependent on American state and private assets, while relying on Washington as before is no longer possible.